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People sometimes choose to remain ignorant, even when information comes at low marginal 
costs and promises high utility. To investigate whether older adults enlist deliberate ignorance 
more than younger adults, potentially as an emotion-regulation tool, we presented a 
representative sample of 1,910 residents of Germany with 13 scenarios in which knowledge 
could result in substantial gains or losses. The strongest correlate of deliberate ignorance was 
indeed age. Openness to experience was negatively correlated with deliberate ignorance; risk 
preference did not and neuroticism did not consistently predict it. Findings suggest a possible 
positivity effect in the decision to access new but ambiguous information.  
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Aging and Deliberate Ignorance 
The idea that the human thirst for knowledge is noble and boundless runs through the 
Western history of thought. The first line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics reads: “All men, by nature, 
desire to know” (Ross, 1924, p. 255). The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes placed curiosity 
among the passions and described it as a kind of “perpetuum mobile of the soul” (Daston & Park, 
2001, p. 307). More recently, psychologists have echoed these views. Maslow (1963), who 
proposed the hierarchy of needs, portrayed humans as possessing an instinct-like “burning 
curiosity” (p. 114) and Silvia (2008) has referred to an emotion-like urge to know.  
Yet it is easy to find behaviors that challenge this leitmotif of an eternal thirst for 
knowledge. Neuropsychologist Nancy Wexler, for example, devoted her scientific career to the 
study of the genetic foundation of Huntington’s disease, which had killed her mother and four 
other relatives. When a chromosomal test had finally been developed, both she and her sister 
opted not to take it. “We were going to take the test, you know, why not? We were the family that 
invented it so how could we not take it? And then I started getting nightmares, my sister started 
getting nightmares, my dad started getting nightmares because you know living with ambiguity is 
not that bad” (in Mishkin, 2016). Likewise, Nobel laureate James Watson, one of the team who 
discovered the double helix structure of DNA, decided not to find out whether he had the 
apolipoprotein E gene, which is the major genetic risk factor for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease. 
Despite agreeing to having his genome sequenced and released, he shielded himself from this 
information. Another Nobel laureate and author of The Tin Drum, Günter Grass, repeatedly 
declined to consult the extensive file that the Stasi, East Germany’s secret police, had compiled  
on him. A frequent visitor to East Germany, Grass did not want to know which of his friends and 
colleagues had informed on him (Hage & Thimm, 2010).  




There is one—perhaps coincidental—commonality between Wexler, Watson, and Grass. 
They were no longer young when they decided against quenching the thirst for knowledge. To 
what extent is chronological age a correlate of individuals’ preferences for knowledge or lack 
thereof? A study by Gigerenzer and Garcia-Retamero (2017) found some initial evidence for an 
age effect, with older adults being more likely than younger adults to forgo available knowledge; 
however, the authors analyzed a coarse and truncated age range (18- to 35-year-olds and over 50-
year-olds). In this study, we investigated more thoroughly age differences in deliberate ignorance 
across a wide age range (21–99 years). Before we outline why age may contribute to molding this 
knowledge preference, let us briefly consider the broader conceptual context of the choice not to 
know.  
The Choice Not to Know  
From a classic economic perspective, Wexler’s decision not to take the test for 
Huntington’s appears irrational. This perspective states that individuals derive utility not from 
beliefs and information per se but from their potential tangible consequences. Consequently, 
information carries instrumental value only to the extent that it results in better decisions. A 
straightforward implication is that people should not hesitate to access cost-free (in an economic 
sense) and valid information unless ignorance of that information confers a strategic advantage 
(Schelling, 1956). After all, they can always choose to disregard that information. At least, that is 
the theory.1 In practice, the assumption that information can be easily ignored seems 
psychologically implausible. Would you want to find out whether you carry the gene for a 
disabling and fatal disease for which there is no treatment or cure? If you found out, could you 
 
1 Some modern economic models do assume that people derive utility from their beliefs (and, by 
extension, from information) about the states of the world. This notion of belief-dependent utility, 
however, represents a strong departure from the standard economic approach and its assumption of 
independence between beliefs and preferences (see Brown & Walasek, 2020).  




continue to live as though nothing had changed? Having recently revealed that she indeed has 
Huntington’s disease, Wexler said: “I don’t think I could have lived with that knowledge,” 
underlining that “denial is important” (Grady, 2020).  
The desire not to know is a rich human phenomenon that has received growing attention 
in psychology (e.g., Case et al., 2005; Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, 2017; Hertwig & Engel, 
2016, 2020), economics (where it is often dubbed “information avoidance”; e.g., Golman et al., 
2017), neuroscience (e.g., Charpentier et al., 2018), the social sciences (e.g., Gross & McGoey, 
2015), and public policy making (Hertwig & Engel, 2020). Hertwig and Engel (2016) recently 
discussed a range of functions of what they term deliberate ignorance—the deliberate individual 
or collective choice not to seek or use available information in situations where the marginal 
acquisition costs are negligible and the benefits potentially large. In situations where both of 
these conditions—low marginal costs and high potential utility—hold, deliberate ignorance 
cannot be explained as a rational trade-off between the costs of information search and the 
potential instrumental value of having that information, as assumed in the classic economics of 
information (Stigler, 1961; but see Footnote 1). Rather, other motives appear to underlie 
deliberate ignorance (Hertwig & Engel, 2016; see taxonomy in their Figure 1), key among them 
an emotion-regulatory function (see also Golman et al., 2017).  
People may decide against acquiring information when the adverse effects of the 
anticipated negative emotions triggered by one possible outcome (e.g., learning that one carries 
the Huntington’s gene) exceed the value of the anticipated positive emotions triggered by another 
possible outcome (e.g., learning that one does not carry the Huntington’s gene). Avoiding the 
information, regardless of its outcome, is thus a way of regulating one’s emotional well-being. 
The same logic applies to one specific negative emotion: regret. People may aim to avoid 




anticipated regrets by choosing not to acquire information that could suggest that a different 
decision (e.g., not taking a genetic test) would have produced a preferable outcome. 
Aging, Emotion Regulation, and the Choice Not to Know 
The emotion-regulatory function of deliberate ignorance may become especially 
pertinent with age. Despite typically experiencing decline in cognitive and physical abilities 
(Carstensen et al., 1998; Lindenberger, 2014), older adults report higher levels of hedonic well-
being, lower levels of negative affect, and higher levels of positive affect than do younger adults, 
at least until very late in life (e.g., Stawski et al., 2008). One influential explanation of this pattern 
is the positivity effect and, relatedly, older adults’ better ability to regulate their emotions. 
Originally described by Mather and Carstensen (2003, 2005), the positivity effect “refers to an 
age-related trend that favors positive over negative stimuli in cognitive processing. Relative to 
their younger counterparts, older people attend to and remember more positive than negative 
information” (Reed & Carstensen, 2012, p. 1). This effect has been replicated across numerous 
studies and several information-processing dimensions, including attention, episodic memory, 
affective working memory, and autobiographical memory (see also Reed et al., 2014). The 
positivity effect has been grounded in the framework of socioemotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensen, 2006), which postulates that these shifts in emotional goals are related to changing 
time horizons with age. 
Can a positivity effect also be observed when older adults have the opportunity to learn 
new information, and specifically information that is ambiguous insofar as its implications could 
be (profoundly) negative or positive? If age is associated with a preference for positive over 
negative material in cognitive processing, older people may be more likely to forgo the 
opportunity to access new but ambiguous information in order to insulate their thoughts and 
emotional reactions from knowledge that could have negative consequences or trigger regrets. In 




this sense, a higher prevalence of deliberate ignorance in older age would not necessarily (or, at 
least, not exclusively) indicate a decline in intellectual curiosity or in openness to experience; 
rather, it could reflect a focus on emotional goals and be used as a cognitive strategy for 
managing attention allocation and information intake.  
Independently of emotion regulation, age may also shape knowledge preferences 
through the propensity to take risks, which typically decreases with age (Josef et al., 2016). Might 
a higher propensity for deliberate ignorance in older age be associated with or even caused by a 
decline in risk preference? Gigerenzer and Garcia-Retamero (2017) observed that people who 
were risk averse for gains and losses were more likely to exercise deliberate ignorance than 
people who were risk seeking.  
Other attributes potentially related to people’s desire (not) to know include two Big Five 
personality dimensions: openness to experience and neuroticism (emotional stability). Openness 
to experience is itself a form of knowledge preference that can be expected to correlate negatively 
with deliberate ignorance. Neuroticism, at its core a tendency to experience negative emotional 
states (e.g., anxiety, self-doubt), has been found to be negatively associated with information 
seeking behavior (e.g., Halder et al., 2010) but to positively predict health anxiety, which in turn 
positively predicted online health information seeking (Lagoe & Atkin, 2015). In light of these 
mixed results, it is not clear in which direction the relationship between neuroticism and 
deliberate ignorance points. Both personality dimensions continue to change in adulthood, with 
people showing increased emotional stability with age, at least through midlife, and significant 
declines in openness to experience in old age (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008; Roberts et al., 2006; 
Specht et al., 2011). 
In this study, we therefore investigated age differences in individuals’ knowledge 
preferences and, specifically, to what extent age is associated with higher levels of deliberate 




ignorance. We further examined the association of age differences in deliberate ignorance with 
risk preference, openness to experience and neuroticism. The study was administered as a special 
module of a multipurpose survey commissioned by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a 
representative longitudinal study of private households affiliated with the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. The respondents were recruited by TNS Infratest 
Sozialforschung, a market and social science research company.   
Method 
Participants 
We surveyed 2,005 respondents (986 male, 1019 female, aged 14‒99 years). This sample covered 
residents of Germany aged 14 years and older who live in private households. Respondents were 
interviewed in their homes via a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI). First, our sample 
was regionally stratified. Next, interviewers randomly sampled household addresses using a 
targeted random walk method (Thompson, 2006). Beginning with specific local addresses, each 
interviewer contacted every third household. One person aged 14 or older per household was 
randomly chosen (using the last-birthday method) and interviewed. To correct for nonresponse 
and other sources of selectivity, we applied individual weights based on the distributions of 
region, household size, gender, and age (relative to the distributions in the 2015 German 
Microcensus). Table S1 in the Online Supplement reports the demographic characteristics of the 
resulting sample, which was not perfectly but approximately representative of the population 
proportions observed in the 2015 German Microcensus. Note that we removed participants aged 
14–20 years (n = 95) from all following statistical analyses due to the combination of high 
developmental heterogeneity in a group encompassing adolescence and young adulthood and a 
relatively small sample size.  
Measures 




The interview covered several subject areas, one of which was deliberate ignorance. We 
constructed 13 scenarios to probe respondents’ knowledge preferences in a range of paradigmatic 
choice situations. Table 1 summarizes each scenario; the full text is provided in the Online 
Supplement. For each scenario, respondents were asked to decide: “Would you want to know or 
would you prefer not to know?” The scenarios, which were developed in German, were designed 
to capture emotion regulation and avoidance of anticipated regret, one of the major functions of 
deliberate ignorance (Hertwig & Engel, 2016). The situations depicted involved the risk of major 
losses and negative emotions as well as the possibility of major gains (e.g., relief of emotional 
strain and existential anxieties). For illustration, consider the situation of someone who lived in 
former East Germany deciding whether or not to read their Stasi file—and potentially discovering 
that friends or relatives had informed on them. Under ignorance, they can assume that no such 
unspeakable breach of trust was committed. Knowledge carries the risk of a great loss (betrayal) 
and negative feelings (sadness, rage), but also the possibility of alleviating needless doubts and 
worries (see Ellerbrock & Hertwig, 2020).  
In order to evaluate the internal consistency of our deliberate ignorance scenarios 
(Cronbach, 1951), we calculate Cronbach’s α. With Cronbach’s α = .72, internal consistency was 
reasonably high, and eliminating any of the 13 scenarios did not increase this value. Note that 
some participants did not respond to all scenarios (see Result section). When we repeated the 
analysis, imputing the missing values with the mean value for each scenario, Cronbach’s α was 
unchanged (.72). To further analyze individuals’ choice not to know, we also calculated a 
Deliberate Ignorance (DI) score for each individual (i.e., an index value between 0% and 100% 
per person indicating the number of ‘prefer not to know’ responses divided by the total number of 
responses. Cronbach’s α for this score was .72. Finally, twelve of the 13 scenarios represented 
prototypical situations in which deliberate ignorance could be chosen to avoid negative emotions. 




In addition, we also included one recruitment scenario in which deliberate ignorance (of 
candidates’ gender and appearance) served to safeguard impartiality, another of the functions of 
deliberate ignorance (Hertwig & Engel, 2016). This ‘unbiased selection’ scenario permitted us to 
investigate whether an age effect was unexpectedly observed in a setting with much less potential 
to elicit (negative) emotions. All participants saw the scenarios in the same randomly determined 
order. 
Further measures assessed sociodemographic information (e.g., age, education, income) 
and risk attitude. For the latter, we employed a single self-report item probing general risk-taking 
propensity. It has been used in other analyses on risk taking (e.g., see Josef et al., 2016) and has 
proved to be more reliable as an index of risk-taking attitude than various behavioral measures of 
risk preference (Frey et al., 2017, 2020). Finally, respondents completed a short version of the 
Big Five personality inventory (BFI-S) measuring openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (see McCrae & Costa, 2003). The BFI-S is a self-
report questionnaire (three items per dimension) requiring a 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies 
perfectly) rating. It has shown reasonably high correlations with the original Big Five Inventory 
(Donnellan & Lucas, 2008).  
Ethics Statement 
DIW Berlin contracted TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH to include the deliberate 
ignorance module in a multitopic survey. Data collection, processing, and storage were in full 
accordance with German data protection regulations. The DIW scientific advisory board and 
SOEP survey committee oversaw the research, and German data privacy laws necessitate that all 
users sign a data user contract with DIW Berlin. The survey data files are provided in anonymous 
form only.  
Results 




A total of 1,570 (82.2%) participants responded to all scenarios; 340 (17.8%) left out at 
least one. On average (median), the latter group left out two scenarios and they did so fairly 
evenly across all scenarios; furthermore, missing values did not cluster with any of the age 
groups. All results reported here are based on the available responses per scenario.  
Deliberate ignorance varied across the scenarios, ranging from a maximum of about 90% 
of respondents preferring not to know the exact date of their death to a minimum of about 21% 
preferring not to know whether an antique statue they had recently bought was authentic (Table 
1). Across all 13 scenarios, the median proportion of respondents who preferred not to know was 
51%. Only small proportions of people always preferred to know (1.2%) or not to know (2.8%).  
Relationship of Age and Deliberate Ignorance 
We next examined deliberate ignorance as a function of age. To this end, we first created 
seven age groups: 21–30 years, 31–40 years, …, 81–99 years. The larger range of the highest age 
group was due to sample size. We expressed the relationship with age in terms of differences 
relative to the knowledge preferences of the youngest age group. Figure 1 shows the absolute 
differences in ‘prefer not to know’ responses as a function of age (in bins) and by scenario. The 
group aged 51‒60 years was the first to show a substantial age-related average difference in the 
preference not to know. It occurred quite consistently across items, with one exception: As 
expected, in the ‘unbiased selection’ scenario (see text in Online Supplement), respondents of all 
ages had a strong and consistent preference not to know. In other words, this item—as per its 
design—appears to tap into a different motivation for deliberate ignorance than the other 
scenarios do (i.e., impartiality and fairness concerns as opposed to emotion regulation; see 
Hertwig & Engel, 2016).  
Another interesting observation from Figure 1 is that the two scenarios on which the two 
oldest age groups (71–80 years; 81–99 years) deviated most strongly from the youngest age 




group both related to health (‘incurable disease’ and ‘genetic analysis’). The oldest respondents 
were much less interested than the youngest respondents in taking a free genetic test; similarly, 
they had a much stronger preference not to find out in their early 30s whether they carried a 
genetic mutation for an incurable disease. It thus seems that with a smaller window of time left, 
people prefer less to more knowledge about their genetic risk for disease. 
A correlational analysis also demonstrated the orderly way in which preference for 
deliberate ignorance differed as a function of age. Table S2 in the Online Supplement reports the 
Pearson correlations between the percentages of ‘prefer not to know’ responses for the 13 
scenarios between two given age groups. For instance, the percentage of ‘prefer not to know’ 
responses in the 51–60-year-olds strongly correlated with that in the 41–50-year-olds (r = .98). 
More generally, all correlations were positive and ranged between .86 and .99. Leaving aside the 
absolute level of deliberate ignorance, these results suggest that the scenarios that evoke the 
strongest preference for deliberate ignorance among older adults are, by and large, the same ones 
that evoke this desire among younger adults. This may be taken as initial evidence that the 
affective and cognitive mechanisms underlying the preference for deliberate ignorance are robust 
across age groups.  
Relationship of Openness, Neuroticism, and Risk Preference to Deliberate Ignorance  
To examine how deliberate ignorance related to other constructs, we next calculated the 
Pearson intercorrelations between the four predictor variables (age, risk preference, openness to 
experience, and neuroticism), two demographic variables (education and income), and the DI 
score. Table 2 reports the results. In this correlation analysis, the strongest association with the DI 
score was observed for age. We also observed a substantial negative correlation between age and 
risk preference, consistent with the finding that risk-taking propensity typically decreases with 
age (Josef et al., 2016). Further consistent with past results, we observed a substantial positive 




correlation between openness to experience and risk preference (e.g., Becker et al., 2012). 
Finally, we also found a pronounced negative correlation between education and age, an issue to 
which we return shortly.  
We then conducted two regression models with the DI score as the dependent variable. 
Model 1 considered only the effect of age; Model 2 additionally included risk preference, 
openness to experience, and neuroticism as predictors. Table 3 presents the unstandardized 
coefficients and their confidence limits, the standardized coefficients, and (in the note) 
information on model fit. We first compared a baseline model without predictors (intercept-only 
model; not shown) with Model 1, in which only age was entered as a predictor. Model 1 provided 
a better fit to the data, and age explained a significant amount of variance in the preference for 
deliberate ignorance. Model 2, which included the two personality traits and risk preference as 
additional predictors, yielded an improvement in fit relative to Model 1 (see note to Table 3), but 
the main effect of age persisted. Of the additional predictors, openness was negatively related to 
the preference for deliberate ignorance and neuroticism was positively related to this preference 
(but note that the 99% confidence interval, CI, for neuroticism overlapped zero, indicating lack of 
significance). 
Finally, we turned to the potential impact of income and education on deliberate 
ignorance. As is apparent from Table 2, in general, the older adults in our sample had a lower 
level of education than the younger adults. This finding reflects the expansion of higher education 
in post-war Germany from an opportunity reserved for a privileged elite to a chance for many 
(e.g., only 6.4% and 3.2% of male and female school leavers, respectively, qualified for higher 
education in 1950, compared with 21.1% and 28%, respectively, by 2000; Rahlf, 2015). For this 
reason, and because education and income were correlated with the DI score (Table 2), we 
conducted an additional hierarchical regression analysis including education and income. This 




analysis is reported in Table S3 in the Online Supplement. Comparison of this full model with the 
analysis in Table 3 shows that the conclusions for the impact of age and openness to experience 
on deliberate ignorance remain unchanged. Neuroticism was no longer a significant predictor (at 
both the 95% and 99% confidence interval) and income predicted deliberate ignorance insofar as 
higher income was associated with a lower DI score. 
Discussion 
Why is the preference for deliberate ignorance more pronounced in older age? One 
possible explanation is that age is associated with systematic changes in the key personality trait 
of openness to experience. People who score high on openness are generally receptive to new and 
challenging thoughts, emotions, and facets of cultural life (McCrae & Costa, 2003), and our 
scenarios may invoke challenging knowledge and emotions. Openness has been found to decline 
with age. Thus, a stronger preference for deliberate ignorance in older age could potentially be 
driven by declining openness. In our data, however, the correlation of age and openness was just 
−.10 (Table 2). That is, the two variables appear to contribute largely independently to the 
preference for deliberate ignorance, with age being by far the strongest predictor (see β values in 
Table 3).  
Education and income were also correlated with the choice not to know (Table 2). 
Additional regression analyses (Table S3) showed that, independently of age, they explained 
some variance but age remained the strongest predictor. Another possible explanation of this 
relationship is that deliberate ignorance is driven by shifts in motivational priorities and 
information processing in old age. According to socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 
2006), when people perceive their future as wide open (e.g., in early adulthood), they tend to 
prioritize future-oriented goals, including acquiring information, extending their social network, 
and expanding their intellectual horizons. As people age and their time horizon narrows, they 




begin to prioritize present-focused goals pertaining to emotional meaning and satisfaction. 
Furthermore, socioemotional selectivity theory offers a theoretical foundation for the positivity 
effect—a shift in information processing toward positive material, and away from negative or 
neutral material, in later life (Reed et al., 2014).  
Our study offers an interesting twist on extant investigations of the positivity effect. In the 
scenarios studied here, the valence of the information is highly uncertain—it could turn out to be 
positive or negative. A positivity effect in the acquisition of such ambiguous information could 
mean that that older people actively prioritize reducing the risk of receiving potentially negative 
information, even if doing so means forgoing the opportunity of receiving positive or even 
liberating information. This possibility has interesting implications. For instance, younger adults 
may decide to acquire knowledge that their elder selves would renounce—knowledge that they 
may later even regret, especially if the outcomes of their decision materialize only in the distant 
future (see Zeelenberg, 1999). Had Nancy Wexler been able to take a Huntington’s test as a 
young woman, she might have chosen to do so, possibly leaving her older self to regret that 
decision years later (see, however, McCloud et al., 2013, who found that younger cancer 
survivors were more likely to avoid cancer-related information; moreover, many who belong to 
the risk group for Huntington’s disease decide not to take the test; Creighton et al., 2003; Yaniv 
et al., 2004).  
There is another potential explanation for deliberate ignorance being more pronounced in 
older age. Older adults’ shorter remaining life expectancy may lower the expected utility of the 
information, leading them to choose not to acquire it. Indeed, the two scenarios on which the two 
oldest age groups (71–80 years, 81–99 years) deviated most strongly from the youngest age 
group both related to health: The oldest respondents were much less interested than the youngest 
respondents in taking a free genetic test or finding out whether they carried a genetic mutation for 




an incurable disease. We cannot exclude the possibility that in these scenarios the perceived 
utility was lower for older people than for younger people. It is worth keeping in mind, however, 
that older adults may value the opportunity to find out about genetic risk factors to the extent that 
having this knowledge may carry substantial utility for their children and grandchildren. It is also 
possible that shorter remaining life expectancy makes the information in some of our scenarios 
more valuable—for instance, whether a god-like entity exists or whether an antique statue that 
may be bequeathed to one’s children is authentic. Future studies should therefore elicit 
respondents’ judgments of the utility of the information and experimentally manipulate it.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Let us emphasize that our cross-sectional study was not designed to discern the impact of 
age, cohort, and historical change. Some of the scenarios pertain to historical events (e.g., the fall 
of the Berlin Wall). Some of the differences observed in deliberate ignorance could therefore be 
due to cohort effects rather than age effects (see Drewelies et al., 2019). This is certainly an issue 
that deserves attention in future research. More generally, it remains unclear what kind of cues 
older and younger adults respond to in the scenarios and how those cues differ across the 
scenarios. Relatedly, how do people process and weigh these cues to arrive at a decision to know 
or not to know, and does their processing change with age? An initial Brinley plot analysis (see 
Online Supplement) suggests that the scenarios that evoke a stronger desire for deliberate 
ignorance among older adults are the same ones that evoke this desire among younger adults (see 
also the correlational analysis in Table S2). Clearly, however, more work is needed to reveal the 
cognitive and affective cues and mechanisms underlying the choice not to know (e.g., through 
systematic manipulations of the scenarios).  
To conclude, people are often depicted as deeply desiring to reduce uncertainty: “an 
uncertain future leaves us stranded in an unhappy present with nothing to do but wait” (Gilbert, 




2009). If, however, the wait can be made bearable or even pleasant by directing our cognitive and 
behavioral resources to positive and meaningful aspects of life—and some theories posit that 
older people are better at this strategic resource allocation—uncertainty in the present may be 
preferable to what may turn out to be a distressing certainty in the future.  
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Figure 1  
Average Differences in ‘Prefer Not To Know’ Responses as a Function of Chronological Age, 
Separately for all 13 Scenarios (Filled Dots) and Averaged Across all Scenarios (Open Squares 




Note. Chronological age was split into seven bins. Differences are shown relative to the responses 
of the youngest age group (21–30 years); the age group 14–20 years was removed from the 
analysis (see text). The full text of the scenarios is provided in the Online Supplement.  





The 13 Deliberate Ignorance Scenarios 
Scenario Topic Prefer not to know 
  Male Female 
1. Date of death Knowledge of one’s exact date of death. 88.9% 91.1% 
2. Unbiased selection Knowledge of a job applicant’s gender and appearance 69.6% 74.2% 
3. Faithfulness Knowledge about the past faithfulness of one’s future spouse 60.0% 51.2% 
4. God-like deity Knowledge about the existence of a god-like deity 53.3% 54.8% 
5. Nazi past  Knowledge of a deceased relative’s potential Nazi past 52.0% 55.3% 
6. Incurable disease Knowledge of a potential genetic mutation linked with an incurable disease 53.4% 53.0% 
7. Colleagues’ bonus Knowledge of colleagues’ bonus payments 47.7% 54.2% 
8. The ‘wrong’ meat Knowledge of having potentially eaten horsemeat (instead of beef) 48.2% 49.0% 
9. Cruel truths  
Knowledge about the treatment of a persecuted ethnic minority in a brutal 
dictatorship 38.9% 47.8% 
10. Genetic analysis Knowledge of one’s genetic predisposition for various diseases 41.1% 41.9% 
11. Stasi file Knowledge of whether one’s friends or family worked as informants 35.7% 41.2% 
12. Entrepreneurial success Knowledge about the probability of succeeding in a new business 35.9% 36.6% 
13. Statue’s authenticity  Knowledge of the authenticity of a recently purchased antique statue 21.7% 20.9% 
 
 






Descriptive Statistics for and Intercorrelation Matrix of Predictors, Demographic Variables, and 
Criterion (Individuals’ DI Score)  
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. DI score  50.9 22.94       
2. Age 54.4 18.25 -.21***      
3. Openness to 
experience 
04.6 01.19 −.13*** −.10***     
4. Neuroticism 03.7 01.15 -.06*** -.01*** −.02***    
5. Risk preference 
6. Education 
7. Net monthly 


























Note. Pearson correlations; 1847 < N < 1910; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; two-tailed. 
 
  





Results for Linear Regression Models With Inclusion of Independent Variables Possibly Accounting for Individuals’ DI Scores   
    Unstandardized   Lower (B)   Upper (B)  Stand. 
Model and predictors B SE   99% CI 95% CI   95% CI 99% CI 
  
 
Model 1: Age       
   
 
 Constant 35.83 1.63  31.61 32.62  39.03 40.04   
 Age 0.28 0.03  0.20 0.22  0.33 0.35  0.22 
Model 2: Age + personality + risk           
 Constant 42.81 3.46  33.88 36.02  49.60 51.73   
 Age 0.26 0.03  0.19 0.20  0.32 0.34  0.21 
 Openness to 
experience 
−2.05 0.45  −3.22 −2.94  −1.16 −0.87  −0.11 
 Neuroticism 1.03 0.45  −0.13 0.15  1.92 2.20  0.05 
  Risk preference −0.09 0.23  −0.69 −0.55  0.37 0.51  −0.01 
 
Note: DI score: Percentage of answered items for each respondent. Table shows unstandardized and standardized coefficients and upper 
and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (CI) and the 99% CI. Model fit results: Model 1: 𝑅2 = .048; F(1, 1843) = 93.73, p < .001. 
Model 2: 𝑅2 = .015; F(3, 1840) = 9.80, p < .001. 






The 13 Scenarios Employed  
1. Date of death 
Suppose you could find out the precise date of your death. Would you want to know or would 
you prefer not to know? 
2. Unbiased selection 
Suppose you are a member of a renowned classical orchestra that is searching for a new 
musician. The auditioning musicians play behind a screen. In the final round, the choice boils 
down to two candidates, who are asked to play again. Before making your decision, you could 
have the screen removed to reveal both the gender and the appearance of the applicants. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
3. Faithfulness 
Suppose you are going to get married tomorrow. You happen to overhear a conversation about 
your future spouse. It’s all about their previous relationships and how faithful they were in those 
relationships. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
4. God-like deity 
Suppose science will soon be able to determine conclusively whether a god-like entity does or 
does not exist. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 




5. Nazi past 
Suppose a close relative of yours has recently died. He grew up during the Nazi era but never 
spoke about that time or his experiences. By consulting his personal papers, such as his diaries, 
you could find out whether he was a member of a Nazi organization. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
6. Incurable disease 
Some genetic disorders are currently incurable and reduce life expectancy. Symptoms typically 
occur between the ages of 35 and 45. Suppose you are in your early 30s and have the opportunity 
to take a genetic test to find out whether you carry a genetic mutation for an incurable disease. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
7. Colleagues’ bonus 
Suppose you work in a harmonious and productive team. At the end of the year, each team 
member receives a bonus. However, some members of the team get a larger bonus than others. 
The reason is that the management bases the size of the bonus on how important they consider 
each team member’s contribution to the overall outcome to be. The management offers to 
disclose the actual amounts paid out. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
8. The ‘wrong’ meat 
The horsemeat scandal of 2013 affected the whole of Europe. Millions of meat products were 
recalled because horsemeat had been falsely declared as beef. Suppose you regularly eat beef 
products and could find out whether you had bought and eaten horsemeat instead of beef. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 




9. Cruel truths2 
Suppose you live under a brutal dictatorship. Your uncle is a high-ranking member of the regime. 
He tells you that he knows what happens to members of a persecuted ethnic minority. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
10. Genetic analysis 
Genetic testing can determine an individual’s risk of developing coronary heart disease, 
Parkinson’s disease, rheumatoid arthritis, certain types of cancer, and type 2 diabetes. Suppose 
you had the possibility to be tested free of charge to find out your personal risk of future disease. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
11. Stasi file 
Suppose you had lived in East Germany as an adult. By consulting your Stasi file, you would be 
able to find out whether close friends or family members worked as Stasi informants and spied on 
you. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
12. Entrepreneurial success 
Suppose you want to open your own restaurant; something you have always dreamt of. You 
could find out how many newly opened restaurants on average go out of business within a year. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
 
2 In addition to challenging emotions (e.g., guilt, responsibility), this scenario also invokes a strategic 
dimension of deliberate ignorance, namely, that of eschewing responsibility (Hertwig & Engel, 2016).  




13. Statue’s authenticity 
Suppose you are interested in art and have bought an expensive antique statue. Its authenticity 
was confirmed when you bought it. A friend of yours is a respected expert on ancient art. She 
offers to examine the statue to determine whether it is truly authentic or not. 
Would you want to know or would you prefer not to know? 
  





Demographic Characteristics of the Sample  
    Sample   Populationa 
Variable N % Total 
 
% Total 
Total 2,005 100.0   
 
Gender   
  
 Male 986 49.2 
 
49.0 
 Female 1,019 50.8 
 
51.0 
Age (in years)b   
  
 14–20 95 4.7 
 
8.1 
 21–30 261 13.0  14.0 
 31–40 236 11.8 
 
13.9 
 41–50 296 14.8 
 
16.6 
 51–60 339 16.9 
 
17.6 
 61–70 338 16.9 
 
12.6 
 71–80 318 15.9 
 
11.5 
 >80 122 6.1 
 
5.6 
Marital Status    
  
 Single 519 25.9 
 
33.4 
 Marriedc 1,028 51.3 
 
50.2 
 Widowed 233 11.6 
 
7.9 
 Divorced 214 10.7 
 
8.6 
 Missing 11 0.5 
 
0.0 
Educationd   
  
 Low level 644 33.0 
 
38.7 
 Medium level 801 41.0 
 
30.7 
 High level 508 26.0 
 
30.6 
Incomee   
  










 1,500–1,999 849 18.6 
  
 2,000-2,999 324 16.2 
  
 >=3,000 133 06.6 
  
 





Note. a Based on the population projection (based on the 2015 German Microcensus) for gender, age, and 
marital status and education b The age group 14–20 years was removed from all statistical analyses due to 
the combination of a relatively small sample size and high developmental heterogeneity in this group 
encompassing adolescence and young adulthood.  c Including cohabitation. d For nonstudents only; low: 
e.g., left school without qualifications, left school after 9–10 years; medium: e.g., qualified to study at 
college/university of applied sciences; high: e.g., completed upper secondary education, graduated from 
college or university. e Personal monthly net income in EUR: for the purpose of statistical analyses, 
monthly income was coded in 19 intervals; intervals were represented by their lower limits.  
  





Intercorrelation Matrix of Percentages of ‘Prefer Not to Know’ Responses Across the 13 
Scenarios for Any Two Age Groups 
 
 
Note. Pearson correlations; N = 13; all ps < .001, two-tailed. 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. 21–30 years (reference)       
2. 31–40 years .98      
3. 41–50 years .96 .97     
4. 51–60 years .94 .96 .98    
5. 61–70 years .91 .94 .96 .99   
6. 71–80 years .93 .96 .97 .99 .98  
7. 81–99 years .87 .86 .90 .93 .92 .94 





Additional regression models with income and education 
We conducted an additional hierarchical regression analysis to examine the extent to which age 
explained variance that was not accounted for by either education or income. The analysis 
consisted of three consecutive linear regressions starting with education and income in the first 
step, adding age in the second step, and the remainder of the original variables in the third step to 
test the robustness of our previous findings (see Table S3). The model fits indicate that age 
explained variance above and beyond education and income. Comparing the full model with the 
model reported in Table 3 in the main text, the interpretation for age and openness to experience 
remains unchanged. In contrast, both confidence intervals for the neuroticism parameter 
overlapped zero in the full model. In addition, income was found to explain unique variance, and 
higher income was related to lower DI scores.  
 
 





Results for Linear Regression Models With Inclusion of Independent Variables Possibly Accounting for Individuals’ DI Scores   
    Unstandardized   Lower (B)   Upper (B)  Stand. 
Model and Predictors B SE   99% CI 95% CI   95% CI 99% CI 
  
 
Model 1: Education + Income       
   
 
 Constant 60.11 1.36  56.59 57.43  62.78 63.62   
 Education −1.89 0.33  −2.75 −2.54  −1.24 −1.03  −0.14 
 Income −0.17 0.06  −0.32 −0.29  −0.06 −0.02  −0.07 
Model 2: Age + Education + Income           
 Constant 43.29 2.31  37.34 38.77  47.82 49.24   
 Age 0.27 0.03  0.19 0.21  0.33 0.35  0.21 
 Education −0.90 0.34  −1.78 −1.57  −0.22 −0.01  −0.06 
 Income −0.27 0.06  −0.42 −0.39  −0.16 −0.12  −0.11 
            
Model 3: Age + Education + Income 
+ Personality + Risk  
  
         
 Constant 46.53 3.65  37.12 39.37  53.69 55.94   
 Age 0.27 0.03  0.19 0.21  0.33 0.35  0.21 
 Education −0.66 0.35  −1.56 −1.34  0.03 0.24  −0.05 
 Income −0.24 0.06  −0.40 −0.36  −0.13 −0.09  −0.10 
 Openness to 
experience 
−1.63 0.46  −2.82 −2.54  −0.73 −0.44  −0.09 
 Neuroticism 0.72 0.45  −0.46 −0.72  1.61 1.88  0.04 
 Risk preference 0.10 0.23  −0.51 −0.36  0.56 0.70  0.01 
 
 




Note: DI score: Percentage of answered items for each respondent. Table shows unstandardized and standardized coefficients and upper 
and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (CI) and the 99% CI. Model fit results: Model 1: 𝑅2 = .029; F(2, 1836) = 27.29, p < .001. 
Model 2: 𝑅2 = .040; F(1, 1835) = 79.81, p < .001. Model 3: 𝑅2 = .008; F(3, 1832) = 5.01, p = .002 




Brinley plot analysis 
Our analysis in Figure S1 was inspired by the Brinley plots often used in the cognitive 
aging literature (e.g., Cerella & Hale, 1994). Specifically, we first we plotted the percentage of 
‘prefer not to know’ responses per scenario of the six older age groups against those of the 
youngest age group (21–30 years; see Figure 1). We next regressed the percentages across 
scenarios for each age group on those of the referential youngest age group and plotted the 
resulting linear fit lines in Figure S1. With the exception of the two age groups in the middle (51–
60 years and 61–70 years), the lines lie systematically on top of each other, indicating that the 
deliberate ignorance scores (DI scores)—the percentage of ‘prefer not to know’ responses 
amongst all scenarios for which an individual provided a response—increased monotonically 
with age and across the scenarios. All regression lines converge in the right upper corner of 
Figure S1. This is due to the ‘date of death’ scenario, for which all groups show near-universal 
agreement in not wanting to know. One scenario elicited almost no dispersion in the responses 
across age groups (see the data points in the shaded rectangle in Figure S1). As expected, in this 










Average Percentage ‘Prefer Not To Know’ Responses Across 13 Scenarios in Six Age Groups Plotted 




Note. Circles, squares, and triangles represent percentage pairs for individual scenarios; lines are fitted 
linear regression lines (based on the percentages of ‘prefer not to know’ responses to the 13 scenarios in 
the 20–30 years age group, the reference age group). 
 
